



The Public Interest No.3

On the Relation of State and Society

An Introduction to Our Theses on State and Society

The relationship between the state and society has been poorly understood. Economistic theories of society are mechanical and further mystify social life. It is a truism to claim “*cash rules everything around me... dolla dolla bills y'all*”. But a critical theory of society ought to push the threshold of such critique further than Wu-Tang Clan.

There are many terms we use unreflectingly: like the public and private, the particular and universal, and of course, state and society. We will demonstrate that these distinctions are modern and historically conditioned. At the same time we reject the general attitude that just because some historical or social fact is false just because it was not written in the firmaments of the heavens. The method of historical materialism is not historicism. We do not engage in unmoored relativism.

We fail to explain anything determinate by deploying a general historical context about which we just freely associate. Historical periods are not held together by a shared context. Rather, the conditions of periodization hinge on an internal social logic which remains relatively homogenous over a particular duration; which generates the given historical context. Historicism is an empirical and pre-critical philosophy of interpretation. It only can take up positive content and it excludes thinking of the negative. As a result, historicism can not posit potentials which point beyond the facts, it can not speak of a dynamic process of historical unfolding.

The social logic that marks bourgeois society is in part articulated by the moral science of political economy. However, on the other side, this form of society was based on the role of free labour in the generating of notions of universal humanity.

The notion of *humanitas* developed its modern character from the civic humanism of the Italian Renaissance. It was sourced from the writings of the Roman orator, Cicero. For Cicero and his early modern epigones, education was necessary to instill the values of humanity in order to form a cultivated man. Near the end of the 18th century the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau began to connect Locke’s ideas of the rights of labour and property to claims of universal humanity.

At the same time, Rousseau could not help but link such freedoms to their very subversion. In his *Discourse on the Inequality of Man*, Rousseau lays out his ambiguity towards modern society.

“*The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, thought himself of saying ‘This is mine’ and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society. From how many crimes, wars, and murders, from how many horrors and misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind, by pulling up the fences, or filling up the ditch, and crying to his fellows, ‘Beware of listening to this impostor; you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth is no one’s.’ But there is great probability that things had then already come to such a pitch, that they could no longer continue as they were; for the idea of property depends on many prior ideas, which could only be acquired successively, and cannot have been formed all at once in the human mind. Mankind must have made very considerable progress, and acquired considerable knowledge and industry which they must also have transmitted and increased from age to age, before they arrived at this last point of the state of nature.*”

What is private property? For Rousseau, it seems to be at once the original sin and the noble lie that makes civilization possible.

The subject of civil society in relation to the state has been the most important issue of modern political thought. We can not hope to cover all the points needed to grasp this totality. But we can hope to add some clarity to our current discourse, which has become degraded by a total forgetting of necessary political and social categories.

One common problem is the conflation between state and government. This error is understandable, especially when the ruling class holds a great deal of legitimacy. However, the state is simply a particular human community. That community can be represented by a sovereign, parliament, or some other form of government. Representation is the moment of inscribing some empirical person or institution as the bearer of state-power. And legitimacy means that a person or institution is the socially accepted representation of the state. This moment of recognition is not psychological, it is socially objective. A full loss of legitimacy for the regime means nothing less than civil war or revolution.

The modern state is also the repository of the perceived universal values, rights, and norms of the community. The universal is the means of human equality and humanity. However, over the course of these theses, we will argue that the empirical representation of the state does not coincide with its concept. In the age of capital, the state is a fraud. In reality, the government can not represent the universal interest of the political community, because the government acts in the interest of capital-in-general. This hijacking of universality was the result of the historical subsumption of society to the compulsion of capital. Rousseau, however, uses a different term for the human community: this is civil society, which is founded on private property. Civil society is the human community from the perspectives of individuals and interest groups (corporations). As far as the bourgeois individual goes, this is the sphere of individual freedom and the experience of our universal humanity. Now free market relations of civil society serve as a substrate for the alien logic of capital tout court.

For the majority of us living through the epoch of bourgeois decadence, claims of individuality and universal humanity strike us as antiquated , if not farcical. The irrationality of capital has subverted both individuality and universality. We will expand on these motifs in these next eight theses.

1. **The state and civil society were undifferentiated in early bourgeois society.** In its larval forms, bourgeois social relations were unconsciously emerging within feudal society. The actors within the English Civil War could not understand their revolution as bourgeois. In this period, both the state and society was juridically defined as the commonwealth. This commonwealth or state was the simple speculative unity of the human community.

During the civil war Hobbes wrote his magnum opus, *Leviathan*. The commonwealth/state is an artificial person. His sovereign is he

who represents the artificial person of the state. In Hobbes’ own thinking, market relations have little factor in his thinking of state power. The State is the corporate union of all of us; this is the universal will.

Hobbes believes this human community emerges for the sake of protecting individuals from each other. He believes that men are always in danger of falling into the state of nature, which is a war of all against all. Most readings of the state of nature understand this moment as a violent civil war, but we can also creatively read such a state as the anarchy of the merchant interest and the disintegrative effect of trade on local communities.

In *Leviathan*, Hobbes states:

“*This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man: I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a Commonwealth; in Latin, Civitas. This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal God to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defence. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him that, by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the essence of the*

Commonwealth; which, to define it, is: one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author; to the end he may use the strength and means of them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defence.”

It is also important to note that Hobbes's own project was not based on society as it was, but it was a claim on society as it ought to be. In early modernity, sovereignty was parcelized. The English king was a weak executive who shared his power with the Parliament, and the Church. Hobbes envisioned the unity of society in the body of the absolute monarch. In fact, the absolute monarch is a modern institution that emerges from the needs of a growing market society, and it proves to be one of the earliest forms of universalism. This may be a surprising claim to some for our readers.

However, if we reflect on the nature of parcelized sovereignty, it becomes clear that the hyper-localized and patchwork existence of laws and rights could not create the homogeneous conditions for market relations. It was not strange for a merchant to be charged a toll several times when transporting goods within the same polity.

The governments of early the bourgeois state took on forms that were but parliamentary as well as absolute monarchy, but the shared goal was the creation of a homogeneous space of market relations. The spatial homogenization of law necessitated an increased degree of centralized political power. But this transformation of society also initiated a revolution of ideas; universality became socially objective.

This early form of universalism was required for the establishment of more substantive expressions of universalism, namely democratic republicanism. Early modern republics were city states. Even the United Provinces struggled to constitute a loose federation. It took until the 17th century for republican forms to be applied on the territorial mass of the nation-state through the revolutions that resulted in the brief existence of the English Free State and later in the revolutionary France of the 18th century and the birth of the United States. These were truly modern actualizations of republicanism. The modern state was characterized by universal equality under the law, however this nominal equality under the ‘rule of law’ would be frequently violated for the sake of the national economy.

2. **Market society develops the distinction between particular and universal interest.** Private property becomes the means of provisioning social needs. As modernization steams ahead, market relations break down feudal bonds. Social and political power became uncoupled from each other, and in this limited sense, market society is a free society.

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In bourgeois society, private property becomes a general form of the expression of personal will and social freedom. According to Habermas in his work on the public sphere, the feudal order had public men such as nobles who held a political character -, but the vast majority of the human mass were private men. The private sphere in feudalism was simple domestic agriculture and small manufacturers. The bourgeois revolutions dignified the private

character of the vast mass of society. As the social power of market relations develops, the state itself becomes depersonalized. Public people, like the nobility, clergy, and the King are no longer parcelized owners of state power. The State becomes increasingly impersonal in function as it is represented by the bureaucracy and formal legal equally. In certain cases the historical process is developed by the means of a concentration of political power in the absolute monarchy, before it was also swept away by the last of the feudal vestiges. The current relation between civil society and the impersonal state is that of particular private interests confronting the universal interest in which they subsist.

Up to this point we have been speaking of private property and particular interest without reference to class. At this point in history class struggle was primarily fought between the urban bourgeois class (merchants, artisans, bankers) and the feudal agrarian classes (peasants, clergy, aristocracy). For the early moderns, bourgeois did not have the same connotations as it does today. Now it is used equivocally with either capitalist or modern society, The original use of the word ‘bourgeois’ was only used to signify the people that lived in the cities and towns.

However cities made a distinct form of economy necessary. For obvious reasons the specialized artisanal labour made payment in kind more difficult, although not impossible. Whereas the agrarian economy allowed taxes to be paid with direct produce, the rise of the city developed the social need for bullion on a significantly larger-scale which could not be satisfied. The needs of urban society were intensified in 16th-century Western Europe after the reformation. The privatization of Church lands led to the expulsion of the large segments of the peasants and a ballooning of the city populations. This new influx of the destitute into the urban environment provided a ready labour market.

The 18th century was marked by a rapid development in the sophistication of banking and the growing power of the merchant interest. Western European states began to maintain navies and standing armies. Unlike the smaller armies of feudalism, which were based on the distribution of land tenure, standing armies demanded the large acquisition of munitions, weapons, pay and construction. To raise this much money, society had to generate high taxes and develop credit.

When war-making became increasingly reliant on cash-rich environments, the bourgeois ideology became increasingly powerful. Strong markets meant strong militaries. The 18th-century English philosopher Bernard Mandeville understood the new market society as a contradictory social form where private vices could create “publick benefits”. This idea was critical for both Kant’s ideas of unsocial sociability and Adam Smith’s theory of modern society.

18th-century intellectual ideas began to understand the universal needs of the state demanding on the flourishing of the particular desires of market society. For a strong tax system, and cheap credit the state was invested in preserving the proprietorship rights of individuals.

3. **Capital subsumes society.** Kant defines judgement as thinking the particular subsumed under the universal. For Kant this act of subsumption is the model of reason. The Hegelian critique of judgments of subsumption points out that Kant annihilates the individual in the process. The true universal must always count the individual amongst its particular members. In a free society, universality preserves the individuality of its members, but in an irrational and unfree world everything is subsumed into a homogeneity.

The particular interest formally subsumes a vast range of needs, wants, and desires of various individuals, but when all forms of human goods are mediated by money, money becomes a means and an end. When wage-labour became a universal condition in Western Europe, civil society became a synonym of market society.

But market society was not a sufficient reason for the total domination of capital. Money could ostensibly mediate a wide range of social relations without dominating them. Marx made a distinction between formal and full subsumption of capital because of this qualitative distinction. In relation to the labour process, formal subsumption is merely a matter of workers earning a wage. However, when labour enters the dynamic of full subsumption we see the deployment of machinery in the labour process in order to intensify exploitation. Full subsumption is the world of machinery and large scale industry. In this transformation, money is reinvested into the labour process to expand production. But the ratio of reinvestment in full subsumption is biased towards capital layout on machinery and logistics.

While reinvestment under conditions of formal subsumption of capital can increase employment, full subsumption investments throw workers out on the streets. When new automation allows one worker to do the work of five it also means that four people in that factory have been rendered superfluous.

Marx’s notion of formal and full subsumption was initially applied to the labour process, but it is not too difficult to expand this logic to a higher level of abstraction. In the 17th century early bourgeois society was largely monetized but the business cycle did not have the kind of epochal role it has now. Credit was relatively limited, and in many Western nations like France credit was largely obtained via personal relationships. The largest companies of this era were chartered monopolies, mercantilist capital was largely a tool of statecraft and empire, rather of than civil society.

Mercantilism was a middle ground between feudalism and capitalism, and colonial charters were parcelized sovereignty in corporate form. We believe it is equally important to understand mercantilist capital as capital against market society. Most market actors were only small shopkeepers and artisans, but really sizable wealth was protected behind coercive state charters and penalties. The ideology of mercantilism claimed the “reason of the state” to justify its existence as part of a highly competitive trade system. But monopolies used this political privilege to decimate the small producers of the home market. This whole episode of mercantilism was as important to the formation of capitalism as the primitive accumulation of the church lands in the 16th century.

It seems ironic that the suppression of market dynamics was needed for the formations of large capitals. This is precisely why we must

distinguish capitalism from markets. When we speak of the relation between the state and capital, or the state and civil society, we are making distinct determinations. Capitalism is a creature of the state, not the market. Dispossession and inequality are founded on cartelized violence. When former chartered monopolies become so large that they no longer need protection, they transform their political privileges into overwhelming social power by the means of market mechanism. Mechanisms that have become so distorted by violence and injustice that they subvert the freedoms of civil society. Capital now dominates society by the means of the market.

The subsumption of society is not only the capacity for nearly all goods and values to be mediated by money. This is merely a formal relation. The full subsumption of society is the totalizing transformation and harmonization of social life and state policy to the needs of capital. This subsumptive power reaches into the logic of liberal electionism. Responsible governance and democratic legitimacy hinges on the ruling party protecting large national capitals and foreign investment as the means of ensuring “market growth”. This so-called growth comes at the cost of market dynamism, increased precaritization of petit-bourgeois shopkeepers and professionals, and dehumanization of the working class.

4. The capitalist state presents the particular interest of its ruling-class as universal.
The rise of the bourgeois organic intellectuals gives us clear examples in Montesque, John Locke, David Hume, and Adam Smith. These thinkers tied the health of the commonwealth or population to free-trade. The bourgeois ideology became increasingly solidified around statistics —the science of the state. Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*, maybe the most famous example of this ideological operation.

When Smith speaks of the wealth of the nation, the nation is understood in an undifferentiated sense. All nations are split into classes which are generated out of the sphere of production. Civil society only forms a unity in the speculative expression of political economy. This subject matter is the highest form of the statistical sciences. Even the young Marx goes so far to claim that we must “seek for the anatomy of civil society in political economy”.

This was not an uncritical acceptance of political economy as a science. Rather this understanding was developed out of the understanding that the project of political economy understood a distinct relation between the state and civil society. Dutch merchants never developed a tradition of political economy, despite pioneering joint stock companies, stock markets, and innovations in actuarial science. Unlike France and Britain, the Dutch lacked a strong nation-state, electing to organize politically as a loose federation of provinces. The strong states of France and Britain could employ the reason of the state to justify national policies in matters of trade. And political economy was the moral philosophy of what state power ought to do in matters of trade.

The *reason of the state* was the rhetorical means by which the ruling class identified the growth of power of the capitalist class with the capacity to fund the nation-state. The national interest can always identify some private interest in a discrete industry or colonial resource holding, with the universal interest of the body politics.

Marx’s ultimate difference with Hegel could be found in the reading of the philosophy of the state. Whereas Hegel uncritically understood the State as the universal, Marx discovered that this universal character was fraudulent and one-sided.

In the *German Ideology*, Marx and Engels state:

With the development and accumulation of bourgeois property, i.e., with the development of commerce and industry, individuals grew richer and richer while the state fell ever more deeply into debt. It is therefore obvious that as soon as the bourgeoisie has accumulated money, the state has to beg from the bourgeoisie and in the end it is actually bought up by the latter. This takes place in the period in which the bourgeoisie is still confronted by another class, and consequently the state can retain some appearance of independence in relation to both of them. Even after the state has been bought up (by special trusts, interest groups, lobbying, bribes, etc), it still needs money and, therefore, continues to be dependent on the bourgeoisie; nevertheless, when the interests of the bourgeoisie demanded, the state can have at its disposal more funds than states which are less developed and, therefore, less burdened with debts.

It would help our reader to know that the term “capitalism” was never used by Marx and Engels. The term at the time was used to describe a system of war profiteering through making loans to state governments in times of war. Thinkers like Hume and Kant realised that this would be the basis of the subordination of the state to capital.

5. The capitalist state takes the form of a system of nation-states. The overarching logic of the capitalist state is the world-market, which is a global logic that particular national political parties are beholden to.
The capitalist state is the territorial means of controlling labour and administering capital. Furthermore, the state’s territorial discontinuity ensures that the state must act in a localized and provisional fashion. The international state-system will always be less coordinated than global trade. Particularized nation-states will always have an external and mechanical relation to global trade and labour arbitrage, and this means that the state-system creates a logic of inter-state competition to be attractive to capital investment.

When theorists evaluate the capitalist state within the boundaries of methodological nationalism they are at a loss to explain why governments of the Global South undergo IMF developmental strategies that they know will be ruinous to the nation as a whole, and even to their capitalists. Any theories that only frame the capitalist-state as a relation between a discrete nation-state and its national capitalist class can not grasp that governments also need international capital flow to fund government bonds. Likewise international capital is developing domestic industry. The world-market is equally important to understanding the antagonistic relation between national state policies and the domestic working class. These tensions escalate when governments need to ensure cheap and flexible labour regimes that can export commodities that can undercut other similarly developed nation states. Governments will antagonize the domestic population for the sake of competitive trade and global investments; it will administer austerity, debase the currency, and create inflation and deflation. All of this is in the name of necessity, which is to say unfreedom.

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The capitalist state is thus definitionally a system of discrete nations-states, insofar as they are subsumed under the laws of motion of value in the appearance of a world-market. Global liquidity is not the only limit to the particular moments of the state-system. The capitalist state is also the negative unity of its warring members. Military aggression between states is fundamental to the ideology of real politics. State legitimacy is not freestanding power, it hinges on the populations’ fear of total war. This same fear is present in the felt need for the police.

The elements of the capitalist state attempt to manage war and trade by the means of federation. These alliances provide some degree of strategic depth for individual nation-states, but taken as a whole, the politics of federation intensify the contradiction of the state-system, and lead to wars that are even more exhausting to national markets and create unbearable debts.

6. Capitals and capital-in-general mirror the relationship between market society and the capitalist state. One sector of capital can never dominate the state without extraordinary consequences.
The capitalist class can be said to rule capitalist society, but they do not need to rule in a mechanical fashion. Many theories of capitalist rule stress that the business interest can puppet the state by means of money. It would deny universal experience and common sense not to acknowledge that the wealthy rule society by means of corruption. But a personalized theory of power like elite patron-client relations, fails to understand the historical uniqueness of capitalism as impersonal social domination.

Ultimately, capitalists rule only as personifications of their social power, the power of capital. This power is expressed in its highest potential form as the social power of money. Ideally this would be world money, namely the U.S. dollar. However, money is not a stand-in for capital. Unlike Thomas Piketty, we do not think that capital is definitionally money. Money is only the most fluid form of capital, machinery, buildings, land, intellectual property and material are also part of capital; even if some have a fictitious character.

Capitals employ labour to generate distinct use-values. These categories of use-values in production constitute sectors of industry. The various capitals within a sector of industry share supply chains and skilled labour. Despite internal competition, sectors have affinities that bring their interests in line to influence state policy. When the pool of firms in a sector forms an oligopoly, the captains of industry find the temptation to shut out the law of competition irresistible, Cartelization in an inexorable social law to protect the market power of these vast firms.

Discrete capitalists may control the state themselves, or they may have proxies. But the state is capable of being under control of the capitalist class even if their political party of choice is not elected by a liberal democracy. Syriza was carried into power by mass political will of the Greek people. This party was a coalition of the radical left, ideologically pro-working class. But when Greece butt heads with the EU, Syriza folded. It instituted the most brutal austerity policies and it ruined the Left elements of Greek civil society.

Syriza was disciplined by the European bond market. It is the state’s need for funding that proves to be the real means for its subordination. Syriza was not part of any real political international pact with other left European parties, and they had no revolutionary plan to transcend the state of things. So Greece as a small country was forced to accede to the harsh demands of European capital. As of now, Greece’s youth unemployment is nearly 20% after massaging the data. In reality it is likely much higher.

Left parties in Europe have led some of the most critical pivots to neoliberalism and austerity. We are thinking of Francois Mitterrand’s Socialist Party, as well as Giuliana Amato, who was a communist before turning into a total neoliberal ghoul in the ‘90s. In the case of both France and Italy, two existing socialist parties brought Reaganism to Europe. These seemingly political 180s can not be explained merely by ideology.

If a Left party is fundamentally reformist in orientation, they will need to use state policy to win their constituency benefits and concessions. However, the state can only be used in this instrumental way if it is not in crisis. State crisis forms when accumulation within a given territory is no longer viable. When a state is experiencing capital flight and hyperinflation, it means it has lost command over capital. At this point all other national policies are irrelevant. Within capitalist politics, the crisis of accumulation can become a barrier to social reforms. The socialist parties will be forced to manage the state for the capitalist.

When the state is nakedly controlled by a party backed by capitalist, it still demonstrates a degree of restraint. Firstly a ‘capitalist’ political party is rarely backed by the entire capitalist class. In multi-party elections, parties are supported by branches of industry, sectors of capital, national and international interests. However, when a political party rules, if they only rule for the interest of national capitals, or the natural resource sector of the economy, the capital-in-general will go into revolt. This can be seen in phenomena such as Dutch disease, or Canada’s need to preserve home value at the cost of a zero growth economy

Capital-in-general is represented via the bond market and high finance. The M-M’ circuit is money fetishism, it represents money to increased money without ever entering production and commercial trade. The state’s need for capital liquidity gives finance capital a distinct privilege in relation to the other forms of capitals. Hence the money-form is the most universal expression of capital. However, when money becomes an abstract universal, and the delusive quality of money fetishism is exposed, financial crisis is the given form. And the crisis of global capital is always financial in form.

Money fetishism increases the rent-seeking powers of financial expropriation over other sectors of capital. When this goes too far, finance capital is revealed to be fictitious at time of valorization. State policies that attempt to preserve eternal access to cheap credit finally proves finance capital to be merely one sector of capital. And a sector of capital in its most mystified form. Capital-in-general proves to be a necessary illusion, but an illusion none the less,

Capitalist society is particularist to the core and shot through with contradictions. It rejects all means to take on a form rational and universal. Capital-in-general proves to be a mere counting up of a series of particular capitals, even as finance equalizes profits across sectors. This aggregate of particulars relate in totality as a negative universal. This negative unity is crisis.

7. The highest aim of the State is preserving the status quo via war-making: not capital accumulation.
The economic understanding of capitalist war will be deeply impoverished. There is no such a thing as a profit-maximizing war. So why do wars happen? This answer can only be understood by thinking of class society as a totality.

Qualitative changes are more essential than quantitative changes. When states go to war they become impoverished, not richer. It is also very possible that when they go to war they may lose enormous amounts of private property. When we are theorizing the capitalist state, we should understand that the need for the state is the preservation of the situation of class society by any means necessary. This means that the state is willing to risk the loss of enormous amounts of real private property in order to preserve the general social category of private property. The quantitative dimension of private accumulation always needs social qualities of a dispossessed class and smaller ruined nations.

The war-making of the state can be both foreign or domestic. Smaller states in the world system are more often in hot class struggles with their own working classes. The ruling classes from these states lack the concentration of domestic capital to buy off their working-classes and oppressed nationalities. The use of the militaries of most of the periphery nations tend to have more overdeveloped gendarmerie functions, as they need to preserve “peace” within the national borders.

The core nations higher in the imperial hierarchy are more willing to use their national militaries to preserve the imperialist structure of nation states. Their class struggles tend to be less intense because they can use such “~~superprofits~~” high productivity to create relatively robust social security for the working masses of their nations. After years of austerity and ruining of the working-class, social discontent has increased. As the police apparatus and surveillance culture explode, the differences in tactics of internal warfare will blur between the periphery and core. Militarization’s main aim is the preservation of the State and the state-system. The police system is only the internalization of the war.

8. Public debt creates private accumulation.
This is the reason states can also enter enormous amounts of indebtedness without political crisis. Wars can create bonanza in the case of American police actions, because it is not very destructive to domestic capital and it grants the opportunity to loot the public coffers.

Open market operations from the Federal Reserve create secure financial assets that underwrite the money fetishism (M - M’) that has become endemic in all societies with mature markets. The US treasury bond pays out spreads that can only be funded through refinancing and tax receipts. Because the state is reluctant to tax capital—for the reasons Marx and Engels outlined in Thesis 4, it will lay the burden of tax policy on the working classes and the petit-bourgeois. The state will attempt to tax the working class less to prevent the driving of wage growth at the cost of capital. Small businesses are ruined by taxes and highly financialized land rents.

As this immiseration economically ruins the masses, the state undermines its tax base. The state becomes increasingly more reliant on the roll-over of the national debt, in relation to tax receipts. This creates a state that is enslaved to the perturbations of the bond market. But no matter how reliant the state will be on finance capital, all accumulation of value is founded in production.

A Comment On the Mass Party and International Society
If we look at the world civilization of capitalism from the perspective of contemporary politics, we can not imagine the working class winning their humanity. Contemporary society seems entirely to have lost any degree of utopian imagination. Politics has become indistinguishable from technical administration. How much longer must we trust the experts? The fact that we conflate expertise with politics is a mark of how removed our society’s politics is from any notion of human freedom.

This distance is also mirrored within the antinomies of the social and the political. It is fashionable to call everything political. Nothing is social, everything is political. But the personal is not political. It is social. Perhaps the need to speak of everything as political comes from the tacit acknowledgement that society has become too weak. Even markets require constant government intervention to operate daily. However, society still remains the sphere of production.

The working masses must socially organize to become a political force. The mass party is not a parliamentary party. It is the organic unity of proletariat society. Authentic working-class politics emerges out of the maturity of proletariat society as a historical necessity. Populism rejects the true organization of mass society in favor of the manipulation of atoms in the void. All populisms are subspecies of Bonapartism. In true revolutionary politics, the head of the party is not necessarily the parliamentary wing. Politics is when some part of society wills itself to become the state.

But this activity cannot be within a single nation. Proletariat society must create its own international federations. We must speak many languages, and we cannot gain in one nation to the harm of workers in another nation. Imperialism is the politics of national chauvinism. Though, at times, it can capture the instincts of the oppressed, it cannot embrace the actuality of their true dignity. Since capital is a truly global system, it must be fought globally. Imperialist defection will bring ruin to humanity.

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